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Abstract
The price of anarchy quantifies the inefficiency that occurs in the total system objec-
tive in the user optimization as compared to the system optimization setting. It is well
known that this inefficiency occurs due to lack of coordination among the competitors
in the system. In this thesis, we study the price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly
market by comparing the total profits in the two settings. The main contribution of
this thesis is a lower and an upper bound for the price of anarchy that only depends
on the price sensitivity matrix characterizing the demand sellers face. We first derive
these bounds for a symmetric affine demand model. Using the same approach, we
also provide a lower bound for asymmetric affine demand as well as a lower and an
upper bound for nonlinear demand. These bounds are easy to compute. In addition,
we illustrate that the worst-case price of anarchy value occurs for a uniform demand
model when quality differences do not exist among sellers. This implies that in many
real-world instances where quality differences exist, the performance under the user
optimization may in fact be close to what is achieved under system optimization. We
illustrate several insights on the bounds we present through simulations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The use of central coordination to achieve a system-wide optimal objective is seldom
feasible. It is usually unacceptable as users may not have an incentive to comply with
the central directives. Although classic problems in operations research assume that
there is a central authority that has the power to control the system, recently there has
been a trend to acknowledge this difficulty, understand its consequences, and design
systems that achieve coordination by other means. These models invariably include
economic and game-theoretic aspects as a way to model user behavior. Some examples
that have been or can be modeled from that perspective include the Internet, wireless
networks, road traffic networks, transit networks, evacuation systems, distribution
systems, auctions, and facility location problems, just to mention a few.
The price of anarchy has been defined in the seminal work by Koutsoupias and Pa-
padimitriou [18] as a measure of the extent to which competition approximates coop-
eration. In general, it is the worst-case ratio between the vaftie of the user optimum
and that of the social optimum objectives. Usually, the equilibrium state has been
taken to be that of a Nash equilibrium [22] - a state in which no user wishes to deviate
unilaterally from its own strategy in order to improve the value of its private objective
function.
In this research project, we study the price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market
[3] where sellers compete through prices. It is different from Cournot competition
[8] as in the latter, sellers compete through quantities. The comparison between the
two types of competitions has been discussed in Farahat and Perakis [11], [12]. In
our model, there is a demand function (representing the customers in an aggregate
format) that depends only on the prices set by the sellers. We show the existence and
uniqueness of pricing policies, and evaluate the price of anarchy of such a market for
affine symmetric and asymmetric demand functions. In particular, we discuss several
special classes of demand functions and propose a lower and an upper bound under
some assumptions. We extend the same approach to a nonlinear demand model to
derive a lower bound and an upper bound in order to quantify the inefficiency between
user and system optimum. Finally, we discuss some insights on the bounds we present
using simulation.
1.2 Literature Review
There is rich literature in economics on price and quantity competition, including
the seminal models by Bertrand and Cournot ([3], [8]) mentioned in the previous
section. Kirman and Sobel [17] develop a multi-period model of oligopoly where a
set of competing firms decide in each period the price and the production level in the
face of random demand. They show the existence of equilibrium price and quantity
strategies for the firm. Rosen [26] proves the existence and uniqueness results for
general oligopolistic games. He shows existence of the payoff function of a seller under
concavity with respect to his own strategy space and convexity of the joint strategy
space. He also establishes uniqueness under strict diagonal dominance of the Hessian
matrix of the payoff functions. Murphy et al. [21] analyze equilibrium strategies in a
single-period quantity competition model using mathematical programming results.
It has been well-known that the presence of competition in various settings intro-
duces inefficiencies in the system (that is, it decreases the overall system profit).
The concept was first proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18] for a partic-
ular telecommunication network model, and has received considerable attention ever
since. Papadimitriou [23] coined the term "price of anarchy" to measure the ratio
of the performance of the decentralized system over the worst performance of the
decentralized system. Dafermos and Sparrow [10] used the terms "user-optimization"
and "system-optimization" in order to distinguish between Nash equilibrium when
users act unilaterally in their own self interest and when users are forced to select the
routes that optimize the total network efficiency. The recent book by Roughgarden
[29] provides an extensive coverage of results on the price of anarchy.
Many studies have shown that the loss of efficiency from decentralization depends
on the nature of the game (i.e., atomic or non-atomic). In atomic games, a common
resource is shared among a finite number of players, each using a non-infinitesimal
amount of it (e.g., see Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18], Cominetti, Correa and
Stier-Moses [6]). In non-atomic games, the common resource is shared among an
infinite number of players, each using only an infinitesimal amount of it. One of
the most famous results in non-atomic games is the price of anarchy bound 1 in
transportation networks with linear travel costs, derived by Roughgarden and Tardos
[28], [29], and extended to separable travel time functions for capacitated networks as
described in Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses [7]. Perakis [24] generalizes these results
to asymmetric and non-separable cost functions. Other price of anarchy results are
obtained in network resource allocation games (see Johari and Tsitsiklis [16]) and
network pricing games (see Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1]).
Although the concept of price of anarchy has been used in the context of networks pri-
marily in the literature, those problems are non-atomic in nature (Cominetti, Correa,
and Stier-Moses [6] is an exception). The problem we consider in this thesis differs
from this body of literature in that it is an atomic game where players maximize
payoffs and every seller has market power. Thus, the direct application of results
obtained in the non-atomic game literature to the pricing problem is not appropriate.
Besides the pricing problem we discussed above, another example of atomic games
arises in the area of supply chains. The literature on competitive pricing for supply
chains is surveyed in Chan et al [5], where they quantify the inefficiency by comparing
the variance of orders with the variance of demand. Perakis and Roels [25] analyze
different supply chain configurations and compute the price of anarchy between the
integrated supply chain and the decentralized supply chain. Focusing on the effect of
competition, Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi-Levi [19] compute a price of anarchy of
4 in a procurement game with option contracts. It is crucial to note that the cited lit-
erature mostly compares efficiencies for cost minimizing games. In this thesis, we have
a profit maximizing game instead. In addition, we consider non-separable functions
as the demand functions also depend on the pricing strategies of the competitors.
1.3 Thesis Outline and Main Contribution
This section presents an outline of this work and an overview of the main contri-
butions. The thesis is divided into 7 chapters, including the current one and the
conclusion at the end. It is advised to read them in order because all of them
draw on concepts from earlier chapters. We explicitly point out such relations in
the chapter-by-chapter discussion that follows.
Chapter 2 offers a review of the central concepts needed for the subsequent chapters.
We present the notation, fundamental concepts such as the system optimum and the
user equilibrium, and well--known results related to those concepts. Next, we list the
assumptions imposed on our analysis and explain the reasons behind them. In the
following sections, we review the central concept of the price of anarchy, which is
used to measure the ratio of the total revenue generated under user optimization and
under system optimization. For completeness, in the final section, we also show the
existence and uniqueness of solutions for the user and system optimization problems.
In Chapter 3, we evaluate the closed-form solution for the price of anarchy using the
affine demand model. We apply the first order optimality conditions to obtain the
user and system optimal solutions respectively. Notice that the closed-form solutions
can be applied to both symmetric and asymmetric affine demand models. In the
last section of this chapter, we compare the optimal prices of the user and system
optimization and prove that higher prices are charged in the system optimization
system.
In Chapter 4, we evaluate the closed-form solution for the price of anarchy using the
general uniform demand model. We first obtain the price of anarchy when there are
no quality differences among the sellers, that is, the values of di are the same, and
denote this quantity by POA,. Next, we obtain the closed-form solution for the price
of anarchy when quality differences exist, i.e., d = (dl, d2, ... , dn), where values of di
differ from each other. We show that POA, is the worst-case bound. In addition, we
show that the price of anarchy increases when the coefficient of variation and/or the
number of sellers in the market increases.
Chapter 5 presents the most important findings in this thesis, a lower and an upper
bound for the price of anarchy. We also include some simulation results to show the
tightness of the bounds. It is important to note that the bounds are valid irrespective
of the quality differences among sellers. In the last section of the chapter, we show that
the argument can also be applied to the asymmetric demand model by introducing
some constants that measure the degree of asymmetry of the price sensitivity matrix.
The price of anarchy for the nonlinear model is presented in Chapter 6. We derive a
lower and an upper bound for the price of anarchy using a similar argument as in the
affine demand model in Chapter 5.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and discusses the future work that can be
extended from the current model.
The results presented in this thesis can also be found in Farahat, Perakis and Sun
[13].

Chapter 2
Model Description
In this chapter we lay the groundwork for this thesis. Section 2.1 presents the specifics
of the model together with the notation. Next, we describe the assumptions imposed
on our analysis. We formally introduce the user and system optimization problems
in Section 2.3. In the final section, we also show the existence and uniqueness of the
user and the system optimization problems.
2.1 Notation and Terminology
This section introduces the concepts and notation that will be used throughout this
thesis. We use the same notations, assumptions and setup as in Farahat and Perakis
[11], [12].
Consider an oligopoly market consisting of n sellers offering substitutable differenti-
ated products. We denote I the set of sellers. A single seller is denoted by i E I.
We denote the set of all competitors of i by -i. The price set by seller i is denoted
by pi. The pricing policy variables for the entire set of sellers are represented by an
n-dimension vector p = (Pl, p2,..., Pn).
For the affine demand model, seller i's share of demand is denoted by qj = di -
aipi + _-ipi, where ai and _-i are positive price sensitivity indicators with respect
to seller i's own prices and that of his competitors -i respectively. We define the
price sensitivity matrix B as follows.
a 1l
-PO2,1
--•n,1
- 1,2
a 2
S " n-1,n
an
The price sensitivity ratio for seller i is defined as ri = Eji a
Zuo and Zso are used to denote total revenue generated under the user and system
optimization respectively.
In this thesis, we consider several special cases of the affine demand function: (i) the
general uniform model, (ii) the uniform model with respect to own sensitivities and
(iii) uniform model with respect to competitors' sensitivities.
The general uniform model
The price sensitivity is the same
1, 2 ... , n. For simplicity, 3ij is
for all sellers, as = a, li
set to 1.
= ), qi = di -api +•-i, Vi =
u -1
-1 .. .
... -1 a
ru = diag(Bu)
-1 a 0
-1 a 0
where I is an n x n identity matrix.
0
a
(2.1)
The uniform model with respect to own sensitivities
The price sensitivities with respect to competitors i,j vary while a is the same for
all sellers.
-01,2
a
. -) 3 n,n-I
The uniform model with respect to competitors' sensitivities
While keeping Oij = P for all sellers, ai differs across all sellers.
a1
-/3
-/3
-/3
a2
n-
"°° -P a
Notice that vector d = (dl,..., dn) denotes the quantity differences among sellers,
that is, the quantity sold when prices are zero. We will consider two cases:
1. When there are no quality differences, i.e., d = (d,..., d).
2. When there are quality differences, i.e., d = (dl,..., dn).
2.2 Assumptions and Discussions
In this section, we describe the assumptions imposed on the models that we study
in this thesis. Consider an oligopoly consisting of n sellers offering differentiated
substitutable products. Our analysis is restricted to models that satisfy the following
assumptions:
a
-/32,1
-On-i,n
a
= aI (2.2)
(2.3)
S-- l,n
Assumption 1. Demand is a function of the prices, that is, q = d - Bp.
B is an n x n matrix of demand sensitivities to price changes. Specifically, if bij is
the (i, j)th element of the matrix B, then -bij is the change in quantity allocated to
each seller i as a result of a unit change in the price charged by seller j, holding all
other prices constant.
Assumption 2. d > 0.
d is an n dimensional vector representing demand when all sellers set their prices to
zero. It indicates the quality differences among all sellers. Naturally, we assume that
d is nonnegative.
Assumption 3. B is a symmetric matrix.
Unless stated otherwise, we require B to be symmetric in our analysis. However,
Section 5.5.1 is an exception when we extend our analysis to an asymmetric matrix
B.
Assumption 4. diag(B) > 0 and offdiag(B) < 0.
For any square matrix M, let diag(M) denote the diagonal part of the matrix M.
Similarly, let offdiag(M) denote the off-diagonal of M, offdiag(M) = M - diag(M).
We assume that the demand sensitivity matrix B exhibits the following sign pattern
which is equivalent to a demand system with non-positive own sensitivities and non-
negative cross-sensitivities (that is, gross substitutes).
Assumption 5. B is column diagonally dominant; that is, Ibil i Ž E.i IbjjI for all
i,j E I.
If Ibii > 3-ji bijl for all i, we refer to B as strictly diagonally dominant. Assumption
5 is applicable to markets where the total demand is decreasing with prices. More
explicitly, consider the change in total market demand as a result of a unit increase
in the price charged by seller i, holding all other prices constant. This change is equal
to -Ibi I + Ejz I bjl for all i,j E I. Column diagonal dominance indicates a negative
change and follows from the law of demand.
It should be noted that Assumptions 4 and 5 imply that B is an M-matrix.
Assumption 6. For the nonlinear demand model, the demand function qi is a con-
tinuous and concave function of the prices, and is at least twice differentiable with
respect to p. Furthermore, we assume that:
Oqi
< 0
Oqi
P > 0, j E -i
Assumption 6 states that the demand decreases strictly if the seller increases his price
and increases if his competitors increase their prices. This assumption is equivalent
1pI "' " Pn
to saying that the Jacobian matrix of the demand function, Jq(p) =
L8pi ' OPn J
has negative diagonals and nonnegative off-diagonal elements.
Assumption 7. -Jq(p) is symmetric and strictly diagonally dominant.
Diagonal dominance of the matrix implies that a seller's demand is more sensitive to
his own price changes than to those of his competitors. Assumptions 6 and 7 have
a similar interpretation for -Jq(p) - when the price sensitivity parameters would be
replaced with partial derivatives of the demand with respect to the corresponding
prices.
Notice that under Assumptions 6 and 7, -Jq(p) is an M-matrix, which is also positive
definite.
Remark 2.2.1. For the affine case, B = -Jq(p).
2.3 Problem Description
In this section, we formally introduce the user and system optimization problems.
We also define the concept of the price of anarchy, one of the key notions that we
study in this thesis.
2.3.1 User Optimization
User optimization is decentralized in the sense that every seller optimizes for him-
self. Each seller sets his price as the best response price to his competitors' optimal
prices. Given all competitors' optimal pricing, p-j, the best pricing policy of seller
i is the optimal solution of the best response optimization problem. This is a Nash
equilibrium problem, which is defined below.
Definition 2.3.1. Nash equilibrium policies: The pricing policies for each seller
are Nash equilibrium pricing policies if no single seller can increase his payoff by
unilaterally changing his policy.
The definition implies that each seller sets his equilibrium pricing policy as the best
response to the equilibrium pricing policies of his competitors. Each seller maximizes
his revenue given the competitors' optimal prices by solving the optimization problem
UO.
UO_ Affine : max pi -(di - aipi + -_ipi)
Pi
s.t. pi >_ 0
UO_ Nonlinear : max pUo,i -qi(puo,i, puo,i)
PUO,i
s.t. PUo,i 2 0
We use Puo to denote the optimal pricing policies of all sellers under the user opti-
mization and the total profit obtained is represented by Zuo.
2.3.2 System Optimization
Under system optimization, a central authority is optimizing the total profit of the
system and forcing all sellers to comply. To achieve that, the central authority could
solve the optimization problem whose optimal solution maximizes the total profit.
SO_ Affine: max
P
s.t.
SO_ Nonlinear: max
Pso
s.t.
n
pi * (di - aipi + 0-ip_-)
i=1
p 0 Vi = 1,2,...,n
pso,i " qso,i(Pso)
i= >
pso,i > 0 Vi = 1,2,...,n
We denote the system optimal price vector and total profit by pso and Zso respec-
tively. Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten [2] proved that the first-order optimality
conditions can be used to easily characterize the optimal solution to this problem.
2.3.3 The Price of Anarchy
Although it is well-known that system optimization yields higher total profit, in many
real-world applications there are independent users who will only accept directions
given by the central authority if these are in their own interest or if there are incentives
that encourage them to do so. Assuming that they will follow directions given by an
authority may not be realistic. As a result, it is important to determine the price of
anarchy, that is, how much is lost due to lack of coordination in terms of profit. In
this thesis, we quantify the price of anarchy as the ratio of the total profit generated
under user optimization over that of system optimization.
Zuo PuoTquo
POA = - =Zso PsoTqso
2.4 Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we show the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution for both
the user optimization and system optimization problems.
2.4.1 User Optimization Optimum
We change the maximization problem into a minimization problem (2.4), where qi is
a concave and continuous function of the prices as stated in Assumption 6.
UO : min -pi , qi(pi, P-i)
Pi
s.t. pi >_ 0 (2.4)
Proposition 2.4.1. Under Assumption 6, there exists a solution Puo to the user
optimization problem 2.4.
Proof. Using the result of Debreu, Glicksberg, Fan 1952 [14], there exists a Nash equi-
librium solution since the objective function is continuous and concave with respect
to pi and the feasible region is a convex set. EO
Proposition 2.4.2. Under Assumptions 6 and 7, there exists a unique solution puo
to the user optimization problem.
In order to prove Proposition 2.4.2, we first need to establish the following properties.
Using the first order optimality conditions and ignoring the constraint p > 0. For an
optimal solution to exist,
azi
api
8qi
- -q i Pi = 0, for some pi.api
Let r(p) = diag(-Jq(p)), we rewrite the previous optimality condition as
F(p) := -q(p) + F(p)p = 0 (2.5)
(2.6)p = F(p)-1 q(p)
Lemma 2.4.3. Under Assumption 6, p > 0.
Proof. The concavity of the demand function qi implies that,
-qi(p) + qi(0) < - V qi(p)(p - 0),
where Vqi(p) is the gradient of qi with respect to vector p.
In matrix form,
q(p) _ q(O) + Jq(p)p (2.7)
Substitute Equation (2.6) into (2.7),
q(p) 2 q(O) + Jq(p)F(p)-lq(p)
r(p)r(p)->q(p)
(r(p) - Jq(p))r(p)-1 q(p)
> q(O) + Jq(p)F(p)-1 q(p)
Ž q(0) (Using (2.6), and the M-matrix property)
p > (F(p) - Jq(p))- 1F(p)q(O)
Notice that r(p) - Jq(p) is an M-matrix, that is, (r(p) - Jq(p))-> > 0. r(p) is a
nonnegative diagonal matrix and q(O) is also nonnegative, thus, p > 0 0
Proof for Proposition 2.4.2. We have shown in Lemma 2.4.3, that if p in (2.6) satisfies
the first order conditions, it also satisfies the nonnegativity constraint, and thus, it is
a feasible solution to the user optimization problem (2.4).
Using Jr(p) to denote the Jacobian matrix of F(p), the Jacobian matrix of vector
function F can be written as Equation (2.8),
JF = -Jq(p) + Jr(p) + r(p) (2.8)
Assumption 6 and 7 imply that -Jq(p) is positive definite, and both Jr(p) and
matrix r(p) are diagonal matrices with nonnegative entries. Thus, JF is also positive
definite. Hence the system of nonlinear equations has a unique solution. OE
2.4.2 System Optimization Optimum
The system optimization objective function can be written in vector form as pTq.
Under Assumptions 6 and 7, the Hessian matrix of the objective function is positive
definite, which implies that there exists a unique solution to the optimization problem.
For more details, we refer readers to Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten [2].
Chapter 3
General Affine Demand Model and
Price Comparison
In this chapter, we evaluate the closed-form solution for the price of anarchy using
the affine demand model. By applying the first order optimality conditions, we ob-
tain the user and system optimal solutions respectively. Notice that the closed-form
solution can be applied to both symmetric and asymmetric affine demand models.
In the last section of the chapter, we compare the optimal prices of the user and
system optimization problems and prove that higher prices are charged in the system
optimization setting.
3.1 Closed-Form Solutions for the General Affine
Demand Model
3.1.1 User Optimization Optimal Solution
We denote zi as the total profit generated by seller i.
zi = pi qi(p)
= pi (di - aipi + •_pi-).
Using the first order optimality conditions, we differentiate the objective function with
respect to pi and assemble all the components 8 in the following vector, d -Bp -rp.9pi
To compute the optimal price, Puo, set this vector to zero,
d - Bpuo - rpuo = 0
B + Tpuo = d
= Puo = (B + F) - l d.
Notice that since B + r is an M-matrix, then Pvo > 0.
The optimal total profit generated in the market, Zvo is the sum of the profits earned
by all sellers in the market.
Zuo = zl +z 2 +... +n
= (puo)T(d - Bpuo)
= ((B + F)-ld)T(d - B(B + r)-ld)
= ((B + r)-1 d)T(d - (-r + B + r)(B + r)-ld)
= ((B + r)-1 d)T(d + r(B + r)-'D - d)
= ((B + r)-d)T r((B + r)-Fd).
(3.1)
(3.2)
3.1.2 System Optimization Optimal Solution
The objective function of system optimization can be written in matrix form as,
Zso = PsoT(d - Bpso).
Since it is an unconstrained optimization problem with a concave objective, we can
differentiate it with respect to the price vector Pso and solve for the optimal Pso by
setting the gradient to zero.
VZso = d - (B + BT)pso = 0.
Let S = B+BT2'
• Pso = 2S-ld.
Notice that since S is an M-matrix, Pso 2 0. The optimal total profit generated by
the system optimization is given as
Zso = PsoT(d - Bpso )
=( S-ld)T(d_ 
-BS-ld)
2 2
1 1
= -dTS-ld - S-1d2 4
1
S-dTB-ld. (3.3)4
3.1.3 The Price of Anarchy
The price of anarchy is computed as the ratio of the total profit generated under the
user optimization and the system optimization.
ZUoPOA o (3.4)
Zso
((B + r)-ld)Tr((B + r)-1d)
¼dTS-ld
4((B + r)-ld)Tr((B + r)-'d)
dTS-ld
Remark 3.1.1. Although the model used in the thesis uses zero cost per unit, the model
can be easily extended to include a fixed cost per unit. If we define d = d - Bc, one
could easily show that Zuo and Zso have the same form as we have shown earlier
except d would be replaced by d instead.
3.2 Price Comparison
In this section, we compare the optimal prices between the user and system optimiza-
tion.
Proposition 3.2.1. Under Assumptions 2, 6 and 7, pso > Puo.
Proof. Recall pso = 1S- 1 d, and Puo = (B + F)-ld.
Since BT is an M-matrix,
BT < r.
Hence,
(B + BT) < (B + r)
= 2S (B + r)
Since both S and B + F are M-matrices,
1
2S-1
2
From Assumption 2, d > 0, it follows that
Pso = lS-ld > Puo2 = (B + F)- d.
> (B + F) -1

Chapter 4
Price of Anarchy for the General
Uniform Demand Model
In this chapter, we evaluate the closed-form solution for the price of anarchy using
the general uniform demand model. We first obtain the price of anarchy when there
are no quality differences among the sellers, that is, the values of di are the same, and
denote this quantity by POA,. Next, we obtain the closed-form solution for the price
of anarchy when quality differences exist, i.e., d = (dl, d2, ... , d,) where values of di
differ from each other. We show that POA, is the worst-case bound when there are
quality differences among the sellers. In addition, we show that the price of anarchy
increases when the coefficient of variation and/or the number of sellers in the market
increases.
4.1 The General Uniform Model without Quality
Differences
To gain additional intuition on the definition of the price of anarchy, in this section,
we look at the general uniform model (2.1). In this section, the model excludes quality
differences between sellers, that is, di is the same for all sellers, i.e., d = (d, d,..., d) =
de, where e is an n dimensional unit vector.
4.1.1 The Closed-Form Solutions
Theorem 4.1.1. Under Assumptions 1 to 5, the price of anarchy for the general
uniform demand model is
4(1 - r)
(2 - r)2
where r is the sensitivity ratio, r = 'a1
To prove this theorem, we first establish the following propositions.
Proposition 4.1.2. The optimal total profit generated under the user optimization
is given as,
(a) (n)(d2)
Z = (2a + 1 -n) 2
Proof. Since the general uniform demand model is used, I = aI, where I is an identity
matrix of dimension n x n. Equation (3.2) becomes
Zuo = ((B + aI)-ld)T(aI)((B + aI)-ld)
= aj|(B + aI)-ld112
Expand (B + al)-1 as follows,
S-1
-1
20
(B + aI) - 1
2a1
2a+ -1
-1
= [(2a + 1)I - H] - 1
1
= [I -2a + 1
1
2a + 1
-11
-1
20+1-1
aI + I -1
where H =
H] 1
1 1 1 1S [I + 1H + ( H) 2 + ( H)3 +2a + 1 2a + 1 2a + 1 2a + 1
Since H2 = nH, H 3 = n2H,...,Hk =n k-1H, it follows that
(B + al)- 1
1 1 n n2
= I + iL± H + H + H + ... ]2a+1 2a + I (2a + 1)2 (2a +1)3
1 1 n nI + [2 + + +...]HS2a+ 1 (2a + 1)2 (2a + 1)3 (2a +1) 4
1 1
- I+ H2a + 1 (2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
2a + 1 (2a + 1)(2a + 1-n)
1
(2a± + 1)(2 + 1 - n)
1
(2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
1 1
2a + 1 (2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
Therefore,
(B + aI)-ld = (B + ac)-(de)
(1 i n-1
d 2+ 1 (2a+1)(2a+1-n) + (2a+1)(2a+1-n)e
1 n2a +(2 1  (2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
d
-- e.
This in turn gives rise to
Zuo = aj(B + aI)- l dJ12
-T
d d
2a+1-n 12 a•+-n
d
= a(n)(2a + 1 - n) 2
oaz(n)(d 2 )
(2c + 1 - n)2
Proposition 4.1.3. The optimal total profit generated under system optimization
is given as,
1 (n)d2
Zso = -4a + 1 -n
Proof. As given in Equation (3.3), the closed-form for the total optimal profit gener-
ated under the system optimization is given as
1 1
Zso = dTS-ld = ldTB-ld.4 4
Notice in this case, B is symmetric, thus, S = B.
We expand out B-l:
K-1
-1 a
L -1- 1
= a+1-1 -1
-1 o+l-1
= [(a + 1)I - H]- 1
Using an approach similar to that used earlier for expressing (B + aI)- ', we obtain
1 1
B - 1 = -I+ H.S+1 (a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
Substituting the results we obtained earlier, the closed form solution for Zso is as
follows,
1 1 n
Zso ddTd[ + n ]e4 a +1 (a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
1 dT d(a + 1)
4 (a + 1)(a + 1- n)
= ddT  d e
4 (a+ 1 -n)
1 d2
= a eTe4a+l -n
1 (n)d2
4a+1-n
Proof for Theorem 4.1.1. Substituting the results of Propositions 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, the
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price of anarchy equals
ca(n)(d 2)
POA = (2 + 1 -n) 2
1 (n)d2
4a+1-n
4a(a + 1 - n)
(2a + 1 - n)2
Dividing both the denominator and numerator by a 2,
4(1 - n._)
POAU = ((2 - n 1)2
4(1 
- r)(2 r)2. (4.1)(2 - r)2
4.1.2 Discussions
From Equation (4.1), we see that for the general uniform demand case with no quality
differences among the sellers, i.e., the same d for all sellers, the price of anarchy POAu
only involves the price sensitivity ratio, r, and is independent of the number of sellers.
The result is expected since every seller charges the same price and sells the same
quantity, and therefore, comparing the total profit generated by all n sellers in the
market is equivalent to comparing that of one seller under either user optimization
or system optimization.
Figure 4-1 shows the price of anarchy achieved under this model. POA, decreases
with increasing r. In addition, it decreases slowly for small r, and the negative slope
is steeper for large r. For instance, when r is smaller than 0.66, POAu stays above
0.75 = 1, which implies that when the buyers are not extremely sensitive to the price
changes, the total profit generated by user optimization is close to that of the system
0
N
0
N
II
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Price sensitivity ratio, r
Figure 4-1: The price of anarchy for a general uniform demand model with no quality
differences
optimization despite lack of central coordination. On the other hand, when r is large
(e.g., r = 0.95), POA, plunges to 0.18, indicating a higher inefficiency of the user
equilibrium.
4.2 The General Uniform Model with Quality Dif-
ferences
In this section, we analyze the role of quality differences in the general uniform demand
model (2.1), where a is the same for all sellers and Oi,j = 1 for all i, j. We have defined
the realized affine demand as q = d - Bp. di represents quality characteristics of
seller i because it represents the quantity sold when seller sets his price to zero.
In Section 4.1, we have shown in Theorem 4.1.1 that when d = (d, d,..., d), i.e., di
is same for all sellers, the price of anarchy equals POA, = (2-r)2. In the following
sections, we are going to prove that when quality differences exist among sellers, that
is, d = (dl, d2 ,... , dn) and the values of di differ from each other, POA, is the worst-
case bound. In fact, as more variations exist in terms of quality difference, the price
of anarchy improves.
4.2.1 Coefficient of Variation
Derivation
Definition 4.2.1. The coefficient of variation (CV) is a measure of dispersion of a
probability distribution. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean of the variable demand.
n di=l
Define di = d+ ei, where d is the mean of the variable demand, i.e., d =
cv2  (standard deviation)
mean
variance
mean2
1
n =1(d - )2
d2
Lemma 4.2.1.
n Ein d2 -(Ei•= di)
2
CV2 = = d (4.2)( d )2
n E2 _ (En =1 Ei)2
i- • = d(4.3)
n( d )2
Proof. From Definition 4.2.1,
CV2
1 2Ei=l d 
- -dE71 di + dn %
We expand E7 i d? and (-n-1 di)2 as follows,
i=1
(di )2
= (n
2
+ Ei
±Z---
n1 nd( n 2
Substitute Equations (4.4) and (4.5) to obtain the results in Lemma 4.2.1.
Properties of CV2
Proposition 4.2.2. CV 2 can only take values between 0 and n - 1, i.e.,
O < CV2 < n -1.
= :(a + 2de~ + E2)
= nd + 2d EiS + .
i=1 i=1
(4.4)
(4.5)
= 1(d+ e,)2
Proof. From Equation (4.2),
CV 2  n =1  .(Zn= di)2
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it follows that
n n 2
i=1 i=1
CV2 > 0.
Because the sum of the squares is always less than or equal to the square of the sum
when di is nonnegative,
i= 1 i=1
SCV2 <n-.
We now consider the two extreme cases of CV2:
Lemma 4.2.3. CV2 = 0 if there are no quality differences among all sellers.
2n d n
Proof. When CV 2 = 0, it is equivalent to n d = ( di)2. This only occurs
when all the sellers have the same demand function, i.e., d = (d, d, ... , d). That is,
n -I 1 d?
CV2 1  - 1 = 0,
n (n 2
i=1 i=1
E
Lemma 4.2.4. CV 2 = n - 1 if only one seller has non-zero demand when all sellers
set their prices to zero.
Proof. When d has only one non-zero term, i.e., d = (0,..., d, 0,...),
n
Snyd 2 =nd2
i=1
nd2
4.2.2 The Closed-Form Solutions
User Optimization Optimal Solution
For the general uniform model, the optimal revenue generated by user optimization
is given by Zuo = all|(B + aI)-ld112 .
Proposition 4.2.5.
1)2nd2 + (2a + 1)22d••E
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n) 2
LA
+
1 - n)2 En=16 e+ (4a + 2 - n)
((20 +
( 2 a +
a + (2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)
2
(EZ E2
Proof. We substitute d = (di, d2,... dn),
(B + aI)-ld
2a + 1 (2a+1)(2+1 - n)
1
(2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
dl E I1 di
2a+1 (2a1)(2a + - n)
2a±+1 (2a±+1)(2a-F+1 -rn)
dn
2a +1
(2 + 1)(2 + 1 - ndi
(2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)_
(2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
-- +1 (2a2a -F (2a + 1)(2a + 1 - n)
di
dn
Next, |I(B + aI)-ld 2 is evaluated as follows,
||(B + AI)-ld 2
= ((B + aI)-ld)T((B + aI)-ld)
n d (2a +- 1 - n) + E di
S (2a +-1)(2 + 1 -ln)
Z-=1 [d5(2a + 1 - n)2 + 2(2a + 1 - n)qi Z= 1 di + (Zi= 1 di)2]
(2a + 1 - n)2 + =1 d- + 2(2a + 1 - n)(qit di)2 + n(Zi= 1 di) 2
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)2
(2o + 1 - n)2 =:%1 d + [2(2a + 1 - n) + n](EnI d )2
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)2
Substituting Equation (4.4) and (4.5) into the equation above, we obtain
II(B + A)-'ldll 2
(2a + 1 - n) 2 (nP2 + 2d Eni Ei + EnI E2)
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)2
[2(2oa + 1 - n) + n](n 2d 2 + 2nd 2, E + (EZI Ej)2)
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)2
(nd( + 2dE:l Ei)[(2c + 1 - n)2 + 2(2a + 1 - n)n + n2]
(2a + 1)2 (2a + 1 - n) 2
(2a + 1 - n) 2 En=1 E + [2(2a + 1 - n) + n] (E i)2
(2ca + 1)2(2a + 1 - •)2
(2a + 1)2nd2 + (2a + 1)22dC•• Ei
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n) 2
(2a + 1 - n)2 E;j 1E2 + (4a + 2 - n) (E ,i)2
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n) 2
Thus, the optimal total profit under the user optimization is obtained as
Zuo = cll(B +i I)-ld11d
• (2a + 1)2 nd2 + (2c + 1)22d En,
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n) 2
a ((2±
n)2 I= I Ei + (4a + 2 - n,) (E E) 2
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)2
System Optimization Optimal Solution
The optimal total profit under system optimization is given as Zso = dTBld.
- V
Proposition 4.2.6.
1(a + 1)nd2 + (a + 1)2dEn i=Ei + (a + 1 - n) E= 1 E2 +( 1 i)e2
(a ± 1l)(a ± 1 --I~
\--Proof. Substituting d = (d, 2,-
Proof. Substituting d = (dl, d21, .., dA),
= dTB -ld
4
4 a+1 (a+1)(a+1-n)
1
a+1 (a+1)(a + 1 - n)
1
(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
di
a+
En di
(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
EI 1 di
(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)_
(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
a+1 (a + )(a+1 - n)
1 (a + 1 - n) E d2 + (E di)2
4 (a + 1)(a + 1- n)
When we substitute Equation (4.4) and (4.5), we obtain the equality,
(a + 1 - n) (nd + 2dEZ Ei + i:n) +
Zso = +4(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
(n2d2 + 2nd 1 ~i + (En e)2
4(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
1(a + 1)nd2 + (a + 1)2dl 1 Ei + (a + 1 - n) EZi= E + (En=l Ei) 2
(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
Z Il
1
4
1
4
di
[dnJ
di
[dnJ
4.2.3 Price of Anarchy in terms of J(e)
Proposition 4.2.7. When quality differences exist among the sellers, the price of
anarchy is obtained as
POA = POA, - J(E),
where POA, is the price of anarchy for the general uniform demand model without
quality differences and
2q1 Ei+ n)2 E (4 2n) (En ei)2n•P + 2ZL 1 e- i + (2;+1)2 [(2a + 1 - n)2  E + (4a i 21]
J(E) =
n -2 + d 1 i + () [(a 1 - n) + ( )2]
Proof. Substituting Zuo and Zso obtained in the previous sections,
POA
4a(a + 1)(a + 1 - n)
(2a + 1)2(2a + 1 - n)2
(2a + 1)2nd2 + (2a + 1)22dEL1 ei
( 1)2(2 1)2d + (a + 1 n) ~ +( 2e
(2a + 1 - n)2 E1 e + (4a+ 2 - n) (E i) 2i. 2 += "
(a + 1)nj2 + (a + 1)2dZ 1 Ei + (a + 1 - n) E~ie + ( 1 i)2
Dividing both the denominator and numerator by (a + 1)(2a + 1)2,
4a(a + 1 - n)
POA = (2a + 1 - n)2
nd? + 2d Ei + [(2a 1 - n)2  = 1e + (4a+ 2 -n) (E 1 Ei)2n 2 dZi=l i + (2a+1)2 (2a- 1 -n) 2 • (4a + 2-) ( )2=
nd2 + 2j d=l (aY + 1 - n) 1i= i + ( -2- )(ni=I
Dividing a 2 and substitute the price sensitivity ratio, r = n-_1, we obtain
POA
4(1 - r) J(6)(2 - r) 2
= POA, -J(e),
where
nd2 + 2q jt 1 Ei + ( (2a + 1 - n)2ZI +(4a+ - n) (E )2
nd 2 + 2dEn l + ) [(a + 1 - n) E E1 + (E1 Ei)2]
(4.6)
4.2.4 Price of Anarchy in terms of CV 2
In this section, we examine J(e) and express it only in terms of n, r and CV 2
Proposition 4.2.8. J(E) =
(n-1)(2-r) CV2
1 + 2(n-)+r CV
1 (n-1)(1-r)cv2n-l+r
Proof. From Equation (4.6),
J(e)
nr + 2d= 1 Ei + (2I 1) [(2a + 1 - n)2  ,S?=1 +(4a+ 2 - ) (En • )2
-d2 + 2j En + 1 ni 2 i=l·i)2]
n + 2di=l (c [(a + 1 -n) En (1 )
2 d - 2 1 [ + 1 n (4a + 2 - n)n (n 1 Ei)2
n2 + 2nd j ei + (2 (2c + 1 - n)2n ••=1 i + 4 + 2 - n(i= 12
n21 + 2ndV 1 [ n 2 (En 1i)2
n2d2 + ndL e + 71 [(a + 1 - n)rn I-E?± = i= ]
n2d2 + 2 Id i + ± ( 1 6)2 2 ( l=1 -)= n )2)n + 2nj j= i=n 2a+1X-=
n 2d2 + 2nd gEil Ei + (I= ei) 2  +-n (n =1E - (=1 E)2)i i=1 s= )22a+1 1 == 1i
(En 1(i=1 di) 2 + 2a+l-n (n E 2 -? (En1 i)2
(n1 d) 2 + al-n (n En L2 (Eni IEi)2)(E=1 di) 2 + (- n i=1 i - i=
J(E)
Divide both the numerator and denominator by (I,= di)2, and use Equation (4.3)
to reach an equation that is only in terms of ca, n and CV2 , that is,
J(a, n, CV 2)
1+ (~2+1-n 2 CV2
1 + ce+1-"CV 2
c+1
Equation (4.7) can be expressed in terms of the price sensitivity ratio r, where r =
n-1
cu
J(r, n, CV2 )
(n-1)(2-r) CV21 + 2(n-1)+r 2
+(n-1)(1-r)CV27n-1+r
(4.8)
4.2.5 Properties of J(n, r, CV 2)
Proposition 4.2.9. For the general uniform model with quality differences, POA >
POAU, where POAu is the price of anarchy when quality differences do not exist
among sellers.
Proof. Given Equation (4.8), if we subtract the denominator from the numerator, we
obtain (2(n-1)r2 CV2 which implies that when n > 2, J(r, n, CV2) > 1. Since
POA = POA, -J(r, n, CV2), it follows that POA is always equal to or greater than
POAU, i.e., POAu is the lower bound for POA.
Corollary 4.2.10. A lower bound to POA in the general uniform demand case is,
PO4~, w= -r) hen CV•,• = 0 (that is, when quality differences are absent).
Corollary 4.2.11. An upper bound to POA in the general uniform demand case is
(n-1)(2-r) 21 + 2(n-1)+r ) (n - 1)
, when CV2 takes its maximum value, i.e., CV,2ax
(4.7)
PO4,.
n - 1.
1 + n-1)2 (1-)2+
n-1+r
Proposition 4.2.12. POA has the following properties:
1. If r and n are fixed, POA increases with increasing CV2.
2. If r and CV2 are fixed, POA increases with increasing n.
Proof: 1. Rewrite J(r, n, CV2) as follows:
J(r, n, CV2 )
1 + (n-1)(2-r) CV21 + 2(n-1)+r• 2
(n-1)(1-r) CV2
n-l+r
((n-1)(2-r) 2
2(n-1)+r
S + (n-1)(1-r)CV2
n-l+r
nr
2 (n-1)(n-2+r)
(2(n-1)+r)2(n-l1+r)
=1+ 1 (n-1)(1-r)"
CV 2 + n-l+r
Therefore, for any particular r and n (n > 2), J(r, n, CV2) increases when CV2
increases.
2. We show in Appendix B that for any particular r and CV2,
OJ(r, n, CV2) > 0.
8n
Thus, POA increases when n increases.
4.2.6 Numerical Results
In the following section, we illustrate some of the results obtained earlier through
numerical examples. The purpose of this exercise is to show the general trends for
the price of anarchy when factors such as n, r and CV2 are varied.
Fix CV2, vary n and r
We fix CV 2 to its two extreme values, i.e., CV2 = 0 and n - 1.
S(n-1)(1-r) CV2
n-1+r)
U U U U-D---U---U - --- ---
. ..... *... ...... ÷+.  ...... ., • ... ', , ,.....+ . .,, .... * ....4 *.... - *- r= 0.3Var ia ble
SD r = 0.3 Uniform a I
I (1n ff\,arihId n
-- - r = 0.75 Variable q
S-- r = 0.75 Uniform q
r = 0.85 Variable q
.* r = 0.85 Uniform q
- ----------- - ------------------ 
----- - - - r = 0.95 Variable q
- - - r = 0.95 Uniform q
4 6 8 10 12
Number of sellers, n
14 16 18 20
Figure 4-2: Fixed CV, Vary n and r
r POAu(CV2 = 0) POA(CV2 = n- 1)
n=2 n=5 n=10 n=15
0.300 0.9689 0.9738 0.9904 0.9954 0.9970
0.666 0.7500 0.7812 0.8802 0.9332 0.9537
0.750 0.6400 0.6757 0.8012 0.8819 0.9162
0.850 0.4537 0.4880 0.6315 0.7543 0.8161
0.950 0.1814 0.1993 0.2937 0.4175 0.5051
Table 4.1: POA, and POA for various r
When CV2 = 0, as we showed in Corollary 4.2.11, POA = POA,. Therefore, if we
vary the number of sellers, it does not affect the price of anarchy.
When CV: = n - 1, only one seller in the market has the nonzero demand. We use
r = [0.3, 0.666, 0.75, 0.85, 0.95] and plot the results in Figure 4-2. The results have
also been tabulated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which summarize the improvement in POA
in a more concise way.
Conclusions
1. POA, is the lower bound for POA. From Figure 4-2, given a particular price
sensitivity ratio r, POA is consistently higher than POA,.
0.6
0.5
0.3
. .
I I I I I I I I I
--~------- ,.-·-·-
r POA,(CV2 = 0) % increase in POA
n=2 n=5 n=10 n=15
0.300 0.9689 0.5104 2.2251 2.7375 2.9004
0.666 0.7500 4.1667 17.3570 24.4202 27.1633
0.750 0.6400 5.5785 25.1895 37.8000 43.1536
0.850 0.4537 7.5608 39.1890 66.2553 79.8785
0.950 0.1814 9.8521 61.9185 130.1394 178.4417
Table 4.2: POA, and percentage increase in POA for various r
2. When n = 2, there is a gap between POA and POA, which indicates the
improvement when quality differences exist in the market. In addition, the
difference between the two values is larger when POA, is low.
3. As the number of sellers increases, POA increases. However, the slope of POA
is relatively steeper initially, then gradually becomes gentler. This implies that
when there are few sellers in the market, a small increase in the number of sellers
boosts the price of anarchy considerably. Nevertheless, as more and more sellers
enter the market, the price of anarchy increases at a slower rate.
4. From Tables 4.1 and 4.2, we observe that the improvement in POA is far more
prominent for small POA,. Thus, it implies that in a given market, despite a
high price sensitivity ratio (e.g r = 0.95) and consequently a low POA, (e.g.,
POAU = 0.1814), if there are variations in the quality differences among the
sellers, it is possible to achieve a much higher price of anarchy (e.g., when
n = 15, POA = 0.5051 and the percentage increase is 178.4%).
Fix r, vary n and CV2
In the simulation, r is fixed to be 0.666, and CV2 is varied from 0 to n - 1 and
n = [2, 5, 10, 15]. The result is shown as Figure 4-3. If demand is general uniform
without quality differences, i.e., CV2 = 0, POAu = 0.75 = .
.V..V.'.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Coefficient of variation, CV 2
Figure 4-3: Fix r = 0.666, Vary n and CV2
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Discussions
1. When CV2 = 0, the price of anarchy equals POA,, which is the lowest possible
value for a given r. This matches our intuition as CV2 = 0 means every seller
has the same uniform demand function. Increasing the number of sellers does
not affect the optimal revenue earned by each seller, and consequently the price
anarchy remains the same.
2. For a particular coefficient of variation value, when the quality differences are
allowed to vary among the sellers, the price of anarchy increases as the number
of sellers increases as shown in Figure 4-3.
3. The increase in POA is larger for a small increase of sellers in the market. For
instance, the gap between the POA curves when n = 5 and n = 10 is larger
than that between n = 10 and n = 15.
Chapter 5
Bounds for the Price of Anarchy
In this chapter, we obtain a lower bound and an upper bound for the price of anarchy
in terms of the eigenvalues of matrix G for matrix B, where G = F-½BrL-. Fur-
thermore, the bounds can be expressed in terms of the price sensitivity ratio, which
is easier to compute. It is crucial to note that the bounds are valid irrespective of the
vector d variations. We also include some simulation results to show the tightness
of the bounds. We first consider a symmetric matrix B, and in the last section of
the chapter, we extend the analysis to an asymmetric matrix B and present a lower
bound that is in terms of the minimum eigenvalue of G and some constants that
measure the degree of asymmetry. The results covered in this chapter can also be
found in Farahat, Perakis and Sun [13].
5.1 Preliminary Work
We rewrite the equation for the price of anarchy (3.5) so that we can express the
bounds in terms of eigenvalues of G, where G = r-½BF-½ .
Lemma 5.1.1. Under Assumption 3, given a price sensitivity matrix B,
4wTw
POA = wT(G + G- 1 + 2I)w (5.1)
Proof. In Chapter 4, we showed that for affine demand,
4((B + F)-ld)T r((B + r)-'d)
POA - dTBld (5.2)dTB-1d
Substitute w = FI (B + F)-ld, Equation (5.2) becomes
4wTw
POA = WTr- -(B + r)B-1(B + r)r-w
4wTw
--- 1 1
WTr-j (I + rB-1)(B + Fr)r-w
4wTw
4wTw
1 1
wTFr- (B + 2F + FB-1F)F-w
4wTw
wT(F-IB + 201 + TFB-1i)F- w
4wTw
wT(F-Br--l + FBr 1 + 2I)w
Let matrix G = F-IBr-L , which is also a symmetric diagonally dominant M-matrix
(refer to definition of M-matrix in Appendix A) with diagonals equal to 1 and off-
diagonal elements given by
B(,j5
gij B_ _- (5.3)VB-, i-B, j VBaia
Therefore, the price of anarchy can be expressed as
4wTw
POA = wT(G + G- 1 + 2I)w (5.4)
5.2 Lower Bound for Symmetric Matrix B
In the following section, we first derive a lower bound for the price of anarchy in
terms of the minimum eigenvalue of matrix G, which we denote as POA(Amin(G)).
Next, applying Gersgorin's Theorem, we obtain another lower bound in terms of the
maximum price sensitivity ratio of G, namely, POA(rma(G)). Finally in the end
of this section, we show that for the uniform demand model with respect to own
sensitivities, the lower bound can be further simplified to only consist of rmax(B).
5.2.1 POA in terms of Amin(G)
Theorem 5.2.1. Under Assumptions 4 and 5,
4Amin(G)
POA >
(1 + Amin(G)) 2
In order to prove Theorem 5.2.1, we first establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2.2. Under Assumptions 4 and 5,
max Ai(G) + = Am•=i(G) +(G) A(G) Amin(G)
Proof. Let x = A(G) where A(G) is an eigenvalue of the matrix G, and f(x) = x + .
For x > 0, d2 = > 0. Therefore, f(x) is a convex function as shown in Figure 5-1.
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Figure 5-1: f(x) versus x
Convexity ensures that the maximum of function f(x) occurs at an extreme point of
the feasible region. Therefore, we only need to analyze the behavior of the function
at Amin(G) and Amax(G).
Recall that G is a symmetric diagonally dominant M-matrix with diagonals equal to
1 and negative off-diagonal elements. Let G = I- R where I is an identity matrix and
R is a nonnegative matrix with zero diagonal and each off-diagonal element equals to
i Bij Oi,
In addition,
A(G) = 1-A(R) >0
Amin(G) = 1 - Amax(R) . (5.5)
Since R is a nonnegative matrix, the Perron-Frobenius Theorem states that p(R) is
an eigenvalue of R of largest modulus, that is,
Amax(R) I A(R)J
= Amax(R) IAmin(R)I
Amax(R) > 0
4 Amin(G) = 1 - Amax(R) < 1
= 1 - Amax(R) < 1 - IAmin(R)I • II - Amin(R)j. (5.6)
From Equation (5.6), we conclude that Amin is further away from 1 as compared to
other eigenvalues of G.
Since G is positive definite, i.e., Amax(G) Ž Amin(G) > 0, from Figure 5-1, there are
only 2 possibilities to locate Amin(G):
1. Both Amax(G) and Amin(G) < 1
Since f(x) is monotonically decreasing from 0 to 1 and Amin(G) is further away
from 1 than Amax(G)
> fmax(x) occurs at x = Amin(G).
2. Amin(G) • 1 and Amax(G) > 1
If Amin(G) differs from 1 by a positive amount, E, i.e., Amin(G) = 1 - e,
then Amax(G) 5 1 + e.
f (x = Amin(G)) =1 -6~+ = 2 +
Because f(x) is monotonically increasing for x > 1, and Amax(G) > 1
f (x = Amax(G))
1 e2
_ 1+E1+7=2±
Comparing Equation (5.7) and (5.8), we conclude that f(Amin(G)) > f(Amax(G)).
This implies that f(x) reaches its maximum when x = Amin(G).
(5.7)
(5.8)
1
.. fmax(X) = Amax(G + G - 1) = Amin(G) +
With the result from Proposition 5.2.2, we are ready to prove Theorem 5.2.1.
Proof for Theorem 5.2.1. Since G is a symmetric diagonally dominant M-matrix, it
is unitarily diagonalizable,
G = PAPT,
where P is a unitary matrix of eigenvectors and A = diag(Al, A2, ... A n)
POA
4wTw
wT(G + G - 1 + 2I)w
4wTw
wT(PAPT + PA-1PT + 2I)w
4wTw
wT(A + A- 1 + 2I)w* (5.9)
We obtain the last equality because P is a unitary matrix, that is, the Euclidean
length of PTw is the same as that of w.
Let A denote the eigenvalues of the matrix, using the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem, for any
vector w,
WT(A + A- 1 + 2I)w
wTw
max
Aj(G) Ai(G) + 2
Therefore, the price of anarchy is bounded by
POA > . (5.10)
maXA,(G) [Ai(G) + A + 2
By Proposition 5.2.2, we obtain a lower bound for the price of anarchy in terms of
the minimum eigenvalue of G,
4
POA > POA Amin(G) + + 2
4Amin(G)
=A G .(5 .1 1 )(1 + Amin(G)) 2  (5.11)
Proposition 5.2.3. POA(Amin(G)) and the actual price of anarchy value coincide
when d = (B + F)r-½kv, i.e., w = kv, where v is the eigenvector corresponding to
Amin(G), k e ER.
Proof. Let w = kv such that Gw = kGv = kAmin(G)v.
From Equation (5.9),
4(kv)T(kv)
POA = (kv)T(A + A -1 + 2I)(kv)
4(kv)T(kv)
(kv)Tk(Amin(G) + XAm(G) + 2)v
4(kv)T(kv)
(Amin(G) + n(G) + 2)(kv)T(kv)
4
Amin(G) + +2
4Amin(G)
(1 + Amin(G)) 2
= POA(Amin(G)).
5.2.2 POA in terms of rmax(G)
Corollary 5.2.4. Under Assumptions 2 and 3,
4(1 -rmax(G))S(2 - rmax(G)) 2
Proof. Using Gersgorin's Theorem, it follows that the eigenvalues of G are located in
at least one of the disks:
Amin(G) - gi,4i
Amin(G) - gi,i
n
j=1
Ž -E gijl,
j=1
jAi
l<i<n
l<i<nI < i < n
Since gi,i = 1 Vi,
1<i<n.Ami,(G) 
_ 1- EgiJl'
j=1j#i
The price sensitivity ratio for seller i is defined as:
ri(G) =S j I i,j
= 5Ig i,31
-E gi,j •
jii
We reach the last equality because all the diagonal elements of G are equal to 1.
Since G is an M-matrix and diagonally dominant (refer to Appendix A), ri(G) 5 1,
for some i => Amin(G) Ž 1 - rmax(G). (5.12)Amin (G) __ 1 - ri (G),
Substitute Equation (5.12) into Equation (5.11) to obtain another lower bound which
is in terms of rmax(G).
4
POA > 1
1 - rmax(G)+ T1-roma(G) + 2
4(1 - rmax(G))
(1 - rmax(G)) 2 + 1 + 2(1 - rmax(G))
4(1 - rmax(G))
(2 - rmax(G)) 2  (5.13)
Remark 5.2.5. Notice that the lower bound in (5.12) is easily computable.
Corollary 5.2.6. For the uniform model with respect to own sensitivities (2.2), the
lower bound can be further simplified to:
4(1 - rmax(B))
POA >S(2- rmax(B)) 2 "
Proof. In the uniform demand model with respect to own sensitivities, the price
sensitivity matrix B has the same diagonal elements denoted by a while the off-
diagonal elements /i,j are allowed to vary across all sellers. Each off-diagonal element
of G is then given by
i,= - (5.14)
j=Zj 1 = ri(B).
j=1 j=1
joi j~i
Corollary 5.2.4 implies
ri(B) = ri(G).
Therefore,
4(1 - rmax(B))
POA > r(
(2- rmaZ(B)) 2 "
Remark 5.2.7. The lower bound in Corollary 5.2.6 generalizes the result with the
general uniform demand case. Notice that when B is a general uniform matrix (2.1),
rmax(G) = r, and the result coincides with that in Theorem 4.1.1.
5.3 Upper Bound for Symmetric Matrix B
Theorem 5.3.1. Let A and A denote the two eigenvalues of G which are the closest to
4Aj
1 (from above and below). Under Assumptions 1 to 5, POA < minAi.e{X} (1 + Ai) 2 '
Proof. Applying the Rayleigh-Ritz Theorem,
POA <
minA~(G)(G + G- 1 + 21)
minA,(G) [i(G) + + 2]
From Figure 5-1, x + + 2 is a convex function whose minimum occurs at 1.
we only need to restrict to the 2 eigenvalues that are the closest to the 1.
Thus,
O
Arrange all the eigenvalues of G in a non-decreasing order, A1(G) • A2 (G)... <
A,(G).
(5.15)
Proposition 5.3.2. For the uniform model with respect to competitors' sensitivities,
4A2(G)POA <
(1 + A12(G))2
To prove Proposition 5.3.2, we first establish the following Lemma 5.3.3 and Propo-
sition 5.3.4.
Lemma 5.3.3. For the general uniform demand model,
POA <
- (1 + Amax(G)) 2  (1 + A2(G)) 2"
Proof. For the general uniform demand model,
a
Bu = oa
4Amax(G) 4A2(G)
1a
ii
1
oJ
The matrix Gu only has 2 distinct eigenvalues, one at ~-n+l= - (G) = Amin(G)
and n-i repeated eigenvalues at + = A2(G) = Amax(G). Since A(G) = 1 - A(R),
Ru only has 2 distinct eigenvalues, one positive eigenvalue at n, and n-1 negative
eigenvalues at -
Using similar arguments as in Theorem 5.2.1, due to the convexity of function x + ,)
it follows that
Xi (G) 1 1= Amax(G) + =A2(G) ý2+Amax(G) =2(G (
Therefore,
4Amax (G) 4A2(G)
POA <POA  (1 + Amax(G)) 2  (1 + A2(G))2
69
0
Ru
1Q
min Ai(G) +i(G)
Proposition 5.3.4. For the uniform demand model with respect to competitors'
sensitivities, R is congruent to Ru
Proof. Given a price sensitivity
tors' sensitivities,
a -1
1 an
0
1
R a2c ~1
matrix B which is uniform with respect to competi-
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
yvxncj- 1
1
S1
-an-I an
1 0
Van an-- 1
Sylvester's law of inertia is stated as the following: let A, B E M be Hermitian
matrices. There is a nonsingular matrix S E MI, such that A = SBS* if and only if
A and B have the same inertia, that is, the same number of positive, negative, and
zero eigenvalues.
We can use a diagonal matrix D whose diagonal element equals to di = - to
transform Ru into R, where a is the diagonal element of matrix Bu.
1
s/l ~
1
/a~n-Ian
1
DRuDT =
[a
0
0
I a2
a agal
1 a2
a anal
0
1
L ,--
01
dn
0
1
1
01
1 2
a ala2
0
1
0
1
/n yan-- 1
With the results obtained in Lemma 5.3.3 and Proposition 5.3.4, we can now prove
Proposition 5.3.2.
Proof for Proposition 5.3.2. We have shown that R and Ru are congruent, and thus,
R has the same number of positive and negative eigenvalues as Ru (i.e., 1 positive
eigenvalue and n-1 negative ones as shown in Figure 5-2).
Since A(G) = 1 - A(R), we can conclude that for the uniform model with respect to
competitors' sensitivities, G has only 1 eigenvalue that is less than 1 and n-1 of them
0
dn
1
a
1
0
1
a
1
a
a 00
0
1 a2
a alan
a an-lan
01 a8
2
a ann-1
1
1
•O•n-lan
0
that are greater than 1.
If we arrange all the eigenvalues of G in a non-decreasing order, i.e., A1 (G) <
A2(G) ... < An(G), where AI(G) is smaller than 1 and the rest of them are larger
than 1.
As we have shown earlier Amin(G) = A1(G) is further away from 1
eigenvalue therefore, A2(G) is the eigenvalue which is the closest to
f(x) is a monotonically increasing function after 1, and thus f(x) is
at A2(G).
than any other
1. In addition,
at its minimum
Therefore,
POA <
minA~(G) [i(G) +
Li~i
A2(G) + G + 2
4A2(G)
(1 + A2(G)) 2
Remark 5.3.5. Proposition 5.3.2 is a special case of Theorem 5.3.2. Notice that it
does not necessarily apply in general. Consider the following example,
1 = r
G= r-2Br-=
1.0000
-0.0713
-0.1060
-0.0617
-0.0162
-0.0713
1.0000
-0.0181
-0.0672
-0.1778
-0.1060
-0.0181
1.0000
-0.1369
-0.1715
-0.0617
-0.0672
-0.1369
1.0000
-0.1743
-0.0162
-0.1778
-0.1715
-0.1743
1.0000
Values 0.5776, 0.9909, 1.0209, 1.1438, 1.2668 represent the eigenvalues of matrix G.
Notice that more than one eigenvalue is smaller than 1. As a result, it is not apparent
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Figure 5-2: Eigenvalues of a general uniform demand model and a uniform demand
model with respect to competitors' sensitivities
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which of the two eigenvalues (the one below one, i.e. 0.9909 or the one above one,
i.e., 1.0209) achieves the minimum of A(G) + \-(') Nonetheless, Theorem 5.3.1 still
applies.
5.4 Tightness of the Bounds
In this section, we analyze the tightness of the bounds derived in the earlier sections
by varying vector d and comparing the bounds with the actual price of anarchy
value. First we consider the lower bounds in terms of Amin(G) and rmax(G), which
we denote as POA(Amin(G)) and POA(rma,(G)) respectively. Next, in Section 5.4.2,
we evaluate the tightness of the upper bound, namely, POA(A2 (G)).
5.4.1 Lower Bound
In this simulation, we use a general price sensitivity matrix B that satisfies Assump-
tions 1 to 5. We vary the number of sellers from 2 to 20 and randomly generate the
matrix B (each generation of its elements is referred to as iteration). Figures 5-3 to
5-6 depict the simulation results when we vary vector d according to the following
scenarios,
1. d = (B + F)F-'kv, i.e., w = kv where v is the eigenvector corresponding to
Amin(G) and k E R.
2. d = (d, d,..., d), it corresponds to the case when there is no quality difference
among sellers. As we have shown the coefficient of variation is at its minimum,
i.e., CV 2 = 0.
3. d is a random vector where d = (dl, d2, . .., d,) and di differs across the sellers.
4. The vector d has only one non-zero element. For this case, CV 2 is at its
maximum, i.e., CV2 = n - 1, where n is the number of sellers in the market.
Lower bounds when w = v corresponding to Xmin(G)
OC
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
number of sellers, n
Figure 5-3: Lower bound when w is the eigenvector corresponding to the minimum
eigenvalue of G
Note that in both scenarios 3 and 4, quality differences exist among the sellers.
Discussions
1. POA(Amin(G)) is fairly tight to the actual value of the price of anarchy. For
example, in Figures 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5, the lower bound is either tight or very
close to the actual value.
2. POA(rmax(G)) is not as tight as POA(Amin(G)). This result is expected as
POA(rma,(G)) bounds POA(Amin(G)) from below. Nonetheless, it is much
easier to compute rmax(G) than the minimum eigenvalue of G.
3. The lower bound in terms of Amin(G) can be tight as compared to the actual
price of anarchy values as shown in Figure 5-3. We have shown in Proposition
5.2.3 that the two values coincide when w is the eigenvector corresponding to
the nminimum eigenvalue of G.
POA
- - - POA(Xmin(G))
. -.... POA(rmax(G))
J• #"• f..
Lower bounds when d = one(n,1)
2 4 6 8 10 12
number of sellers, n
14 16 18
Figure 5-4: Lower bound when d is the same for all sellers. i.e., no quality differences
Lower bounds when d = rand(n,1)
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Figure 5-5: Lower bound when d is a random vector
Lower bounds when CV = n -1
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Figure 5-6: Lower bound when d has only one non-zero term, i.e., CV
2 
= n - 1
4. When the coefficient of variation is not large, the lower bounds in terms of both
Amin(G) and rmax(G) are rather tight to the actual price of anarchy value as
shown in Figure 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5.
5. The worst case for the lower bound occurs when CV2 = n - 1 as depicted
in Figure 5-6. This is because the lower bound only involves the minimum
eigenvalue of G and does not take d into consideration, and as shown in the
previous chapter, if n and r is fixed, the price of anarchy is at its maximum
when CV2 = n- 1.
5.4.2 Upper Bound
In this section, we analyze the tightness of the upper bound. We consider a uniform
matrix B with respect to competitors' sensitivities, as a result, the bound is expressed
in terms of the second largest eigenvalue of matrix G, i.e., POA(A2 (G)).
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Upper bounds when w = v2
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Figure 5-7: Upper bound when w is the eigenvector corresponding to the second
eigenvalue of G
For the simulation, we vary d for almost the same scenarios as in the lower bound
analysis, except for Figure 5-7, where w = pu, u is the eigenvector corresponding to
the A2(G) (which is closest to 1) and ýp E R.
Discussions
1. From the simulation results, we see that the upper bound is not very tight. The
result is not surprising, because given Equation (5.16) and 1 < A2(G) •< 2, the
minimum value of POA(A2(G)) is 0.888.
2. The upper bound is tight in Figure 5-7, i.e., when w is the scaled eigenvector
which corresponds to A2(G). The same reasoning in Proposition 5.2.3 that
explains when the lower bound is tight can be applied here.
3. When the values of di are the same, i.e., when quality differences do not exist
among sellers, the upper bound is not tight as compared to the actual price of
,,,,,
Upper bounds when d = ones(n,1)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
number of sellers, n
Figure 5-8: Upper bound when d is the same for all sellers. i.e., no quality differences
Upper bounds when d = rand(n,1)
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Figure 5-9: Upper bound when d is a random vector
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Figure 5-10: Upper bound when d has only one non-zero term, i.e., CV 2 = n - 1
anarchy as shown in Figure 5-8.
4. When the values of di are randomly generated, i.e., quality differences exist
among sellers, the upper bound is not very tight as depicted in Figure 5-9.
5. When only one di has non-zero value, (i.e., the coefficient of variation is max-
imum), the upper bound is tighter (i.e., closer to the to the actual price of
anarchy) in shown in Figure 5-10. This is because the actual price of anarchy
is maximum when coefficient of variation is at its maximum, i.e., CV2 = n- 1.
5.5 Lower bound for Asymmetric Matrix B
In general, the lower bound (5.11) only holds for a symmetric M-matrix B. For
instance, Figure 5-11 shows a simulation result when an asymmetric matrix B is
used. We see that the lower bound that uses only the minimum eigenvalue of matrix
G does not hold anymore.
1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
number of sellers, n
Figure 5-11: The lower bound (5.11) fails to hold for an asymmetric matrix B
5.5.1 A Measure of Asymmetry
In this section, we briefly introduce the concept of measuring the asymmetry of a
matrix in this section. We refer the reader to Perakis [24] for more insights on this
topic.
For an asymmetric matrix B, we consider the symmmetrized matrix
B +BT
2
Let E = S-'B. We introduce the asymmetry constants, cl and c2 , which measure
the degree of asymmetry of the matrix B.
Definition 5.5.1.
SIlExl s2
c = IIE1 = suPZo I x2 = Amax(ETE) = Amax(BTS-lS-lB).
When the matrix B is symmetric, that is, B = BT (and therefore, S = B), then
cl = C2 = 1.
Notice cl = IIS-BS- 112, thus,
ci S 2lS 2ma 2C2.
But note that numerically there seems to be a tighter connection.
5.5.2 A Lower Bound for Asymmetric Matrix B
When the price sensitivity matrix B becomes, the price of anarchy is as follows,
POA =
4((B + r)-ld)Tr((B + r)- 1d) (5.16)
dTS-ld
Theorem 5.5.1. Given an asymmetric matrix B which is uniform with respect to
the seller's own sensitivities, we define
1 1G=r-2sr- .
A lower bound for the price of anarchy is given as
4
POA >
mn(G) + Amin(G)+ 2c2
4Amin(G)
c2Amin(G) 2 + 2c2Amin(G) + 1
where ci = IIE is, and, c2 = IEl12.
To prove Theorem 5.5.1, we first need to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5.5.2.
where cl = IIElls.
Proof.
wTETGEw
wTw
wTBTS-1 SS- 1Bw
wTw
r-½wTBTS-1SS-1Br-½w
WTw
JIS-'Br- ws
wTw
-< jS1 Bjj, wTwsWTW
2 wTr-2Sr-w
= |IEI | w Tw
WTW
Proof for Theorem 5.5.1. When matrix B is uniform with respect to own price sen-
sitivities, the diagonal elements are equal and we can write I = alI, where I is an
identity matrix. Also,
G = r-2Sr-2 = s
Let w = rL (B + r)-'d. From Equation (5.16),
POA = 4wTw
4wTw
wT'-I(BTS-1B + BTS-1T + FS- 1B + rS-1r)r-§w
wTETGEw
wTw
S T Gw
- 1 wTw
Let E = S- 1B, and r = aI,
4wTw
POA =
wT( BTS-1B + 2E + aS-1)w
4wTw
wT(ETGE + G- 1 + 2E)w (5.17)
Applying Proposition 5.5.2, Equation (5.17) is bounded from below by
4wTw
POA >
wT(c1G + G- 1 + 2E)w'
Using similar arguments as in the symmetric case, it follows that,
4
POA >
Cl Amin(G) + A(G) + 2c 2
4Amin(G)
= 2(5.18)
c1Amin(G) 2 + 2c 2 Amin(G) + 1
where cl = IIE| s, c2 = IJE112 . E
5.5.3 Tightness of the Lower Bound under Asymmetry
In this section, we analyze the tightness of the lower bound derived for an asymmetric
matrix B. We use the same scenarios as in Section 5.4.1. The results for each scenario
are shown from Figure 5-12 to 5-15.
Discussions
1. Figure 5-13 shows the result when the values of di are the same, i.e., when
quality differences do not exist among the sellers. The lower bound is fairly
close to the actual value of price of anarchy.
2. Figure 5-14 depicts the result when quality differences exist among the seller.
Asymmetric case: Lower bound when w = vmin(G)
number of sellers, n
Figure 5-12:
sponding to
Asymmetric matrix: Lower bound when
the minimum eigenvalue of G
w is the eigenvector corre-
Asymmetric case: Lower bound when d = ones(n,1)
4 6 8 10 12
number of sellers, n
14 16 18 20
Figure 5-13: Asymmetric
no quality differences
matrix: Lower bound when d is the same for all sellers. i.e.
a
0l
0.97
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.93
0.92
0.91
0n9
2
Asymmetric case: Lower bound when d = rand(n,1)
0
a-
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
number of sellers, n
Figure 5-14: Asymmetric matrix: Lower bound when d is a random vector
1
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0.93
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S01
Asymmetric case: Lower bound when CV2 = n-1
v.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
number of sellers, n
Figure 5-15: Asymmetric matrix: Lower bound when d has only one non-zero term,
i.e. CV2 = n -
The values of di are randomly generated. In Figure 5-14, the lower bound is
fairly tight.
3. In Figure 5-12, the lower bound is not exact as compared to the actual value
of price of anarchy when w is the eigenvector corresponding to the minimum
eigenvalue of G. Recall that the lower bound is tight when the price sensitivity
matrix is symmetric (see Proposition 5.2.3). This is because the denominator
of the closed-form solution for POA also includes ETGE, and in general, the
eigenvectors of G and ETGE are not the same.
4. Similar to the symmetric case, the worst-case for the lower bound happens when
only one seller has non-zero demand as shown in Figure 5-15. This is because
the price of anarchy is at its maximum when CV2 is maximum, but the lower
bound does not take the demand variation into account.
5. In general, the lower bound in (5.18), which is in terms of Amin(G) and the
asymmetry constants cl and c2 is not as tight as that for the symmetric matrix
as shown in Section 5.4.1.
In summary, we notice the following: including the asymmetry constants cl and c2
gives a valid lower bound to the price of anarchy when the price sensitivity matrix
B is asymmetric. In addition, we observe that the lower bound for an asymmetric
matrix is not as tight as that for the symmetric case (nevertheless, it is still fairly
close). The worst-case for the lower bound happens when the coefficient of variation
is maximum, i.e., when one seller has the non-zero demand.

Chapter 6
Nonlinear Demand Model
In this chapter, we study the price of anarchy for the nonlinear demand model. The
analysis in this chapter is carried out under Assumptions 6 and 7 described in Section
2.2. We show that the price of anarchy for the nonlinear model can be expressed in a
form similar to the affine case. Subsequently, we derive a lower and an upper bound
for the price of anarchy using arguments similar to the affine demand model. The
results discussed in this chapter can also be found in Farahat, Perakis and Sun [13].
6.1 Jacobian Similarity Property
In this section, we briefly introduce the concept of the Jacobian similarity property.
We refer the reader to J. Sun [31] for more information on this concept.
Definition 6.1.1 (The Jacobian similarity property). Given -Jh(p) is positive def-
inite, there exist A > 1 such that for all w and p and p':
AwT(-Jh(p))w > wT(-Jh(p'))w > w (-Jh(p))w. (6.1)
Proposition 6.1.1 (The inverse Jacobian similarity property). If a matrix -Jh(p)
satisfies Equation (6.1), so does its inverse with the same constant A:
AwT(-Jh(p))-lw > wT(-Jh(p'))-lw > 1 ww(-Jh(p))-lw. (6.2)
Proof. Let A = maxp A x(-Jh(p Considering the inverse matrix -Jh(p) - 1, theJacobian similarity co tant for t(-Jh(p)e inverse remains the same since
Jacobian similarity constant for the inverse remains the same since
Amax(-Jh(P)) Amin(-Jh(p))'
Amin(-J() = Amax(Jh(p))
Thus,
Amax(-Jh(p) -1 )
p Amin(-Jh(p)- 1 )
Amax (- Jh(p))
m Amin(-Jh(p))
6.2 User and System Optimality Conditions
To shorten notation, we use huo, hso, Buo = -Jh(puo), Bso = -Jh(pso),
ruo = diag(Buo) and rso = diag(Bso) to denote the demand function, the
Jacobian matrix and the diagonal elements of that Jacobian matrix at user and system
optimum respectively.
The user optimization problem is given as:
UO(Nonlinear) : max
PUO,i
s.t.
pUO,i Ž hi(Puo,i, puo,i)
pi 2 0
and1\
• 1
At optimality,
huo - FuoPuo = 0
Shuo = Fuopuo.
The system optimization problem is shown as the following:
SO(Nonlinear) : max
Pso
PsoThso
s.t. Pso > 0
The optimality conditions ensure that Equation (6.4) holds.
hso - BsoPso = 0
= hso = BsoPso. (6.4)
6.3 Lower Bound
Theorem 6.3.1. Under Assumptions 6 and 7, given a nonlinear symmetric demand
model, a lower bound for the price of anarchy is given as
(A + 1)2 Amin(Guo)
POA >
A 3  (1 + Amin(Guo)) 2 '
Proof. First note that
POA
Zuo h 0oPuo
Zso hfoPso
PuoTruoPuo
PsoTBuoPso"
The goal in the analysis below is to bound the denominator psoTBuoPso.
(6.3)
(6.5)
Since huo is a concave function,
-hso 2 -huo + Boo(Pso - Puo).
Substitute Equation (6.3) and (6.4) into Equation (6.6) to obtain
-BsoPso _ -ruopuo + Buo(pso - Puo)
-(Bso + Buo)Pso
(Bso + Buo)Pso
> -(ruo + Buo)Puo
< (Fuo +Buo)Puo.
Similarly, since hso is also a concave function, we obtain Equation (6.8). We substi-
tute Equation (6.3) and (6.4) into Equation (6.8).
-huo -hso + Bso(Puo- Pso).
-rvoPuo _ -BsoPso + Bso(puo - Pso)
(6.8)
-(Fuo + Bso)Puo
(Fuo + Bso)Puo
> -(Bso + Bso)Pso
< 2 BsoPso.
We multiply Equation (6.7) by Pso > 0 to obtain Equation (6.10).
PsoT(Bso + Buo)Pso
PsoT (Bso)Pso + PsoT(Buo)Pso
Using the Jacobian similarity property, we observe that
1
PsoTBuoPso ! Pso BsoPso.A
(6.6)
(6.9)
< PsoT( F uo + Buo)Puo
SPsoT(rF o + Buo)puo. (6.10)
(6.11)
(6.7)
Thus, Equation (6.10) becomes
1
Pso T ( B s o )P s o + IPso (Bso)PsoA
+ ) PsoT(Bso)Pso
• PsoT (uo + Buo)Puo
• PsoT(Tuo + Buo)puo.
We replace Equation (6.12) by I = BuoBuo- ', and apply the Cauchy's inequality
to obtain Equation (6.14).
+ IPsolso •<-PsoIIBsol Bso-l(ruo + BUO)PUollBso. (6.13)
After canceling the term IPso lBso from both sides of the inequality, we obtain
+ A)PsOIBso - IlBso-l(ruo + Buo)PuollBso
IIPSOIIBso • A ) IBso- (ruo + Buo)puo IBso.A+I
We square both sides of the inequality to obtain
Pso IIBso
A1)2 PuoT(ruo + Buo)TBso-l(Puo + Buo)puo. (6.14)
Substituting inequality (6.14) into the denominator of Equation (6.5),
POA4 (A+1) 2A puoTLuopuopuoT(Fuo + Buo)TBso-l(ruo + Buo)puo
Applying the Jacobian similarity property to the inverse matrix, and using Proposi-
(6.12)
(6.15)
tion 6.2,
PuoT(Fuo + Buo)TBso-i(Fuo + Buo)Puo 5
ApUOT(Fuo + Buo)TBuol(Fruo + Buo)puo.
The lower bound for the price anarchy function becomes
POA >
(A + 1)2 PuoTruoPuo
A3 PuoT(FUo + Buo)TBuo-l(ruo + Buo)Puo
1We can use the same argument as in the affine demand model. Let w = Fuo 2 Puo
1 1
and Gvo = rvo- Bvorvo - , the lower bound can be further simplified as follows:
wTw
A3 wTruo-o(ruo + Buo)TBuo-l(Fuo + Buo)ruo- W
wTw
A3 wT(Guo + Guo - ' + 2I)w
(A + 1)2
A3 Amax(Guo + Guo - 1 + 21)
(A + 1)2
A3  Amin(Guo) + mnGo) + 2
(A + 1)2 Amin(Gvo) (6.16)
A 3 (1 + Amin(Gvo)) 2 "
O
Corollary 6.3.2. When matrix Buo is asymmetric, we can use the symmetrized
matrix, Suo = "Bu+2B2 , and Guo = Fvo-ASUoFvo- 1
POA >
(A + 1)2 Amin(Guo)
A 3 C2 min(GUO) 2 + 2c 2 Amin(Guo) + 1'
where cl = , ISuioBuollsUo
, and c2 = ISu OBuo 12.
POA >
(A + 1)2
(A + 1)2
Remark 6.3.3. When the demand function is affine, (i.e., A = 1), the lower bounds
(for both the symmetric and asymmetric demand cases) coincide with the results we
obtained in Chapter 5.
6.4 Upper Bound
Proposition 6.4.1. Under Assumptions 6 and 7, given a nonlinear, symmetric de-
mand model, an upper bound for the price of anarchy is given as
POA <
(2A) 2 puoTpuoPuo
PuoT(Fuo + Buo)TBuo-l(Fuo + Buo)Puo
Proof. Recall (6.9),
(Fuo + Bso)puo < 2BsoPso.
Since Bso is an M-matrix, Bso - 1 > 0. Hence,
(ruo + Bso)Bso -1 = ruoBso - ' + I > 0.
Multiply (6.9) with puoT(Fuo + Bso)Bso - 1 > 0, we obtain
PuoT(Fuo + Bso)Bso-l(Fvo + Bso)Pvo 5 2puoT(ruo + Bso)Pso
Applying Cauchy's inequality,
IIBso-l(ruo + Bso)puo IBso <
2I|puo Bso IIBso-(Fuo + Bso)Puo IBso
(6.17)
(6.18)
IIBso-l(Fuo + Bso)PuooIBso 5 211psollaso
Square both sides and apply the Jacobian similarity property,
PuoT(F uo + Bso)Bso - 1(uo + Bso)puo • 4ApsoTBuopso (6.19)
In what follows, we show that IIBso- (ruo + Bso)PuooI2so is lower bounded by
'IIBuo- (ruo + Buo)Puo 2 uo
PuoT(Fuo + Bso)Bso-I(Fuo + Bso)Puo
= PuoT(Fuo + Bso)(I + Bso-ifuo)Puo
= PuoTBsoPuo + 2puoT uoPuo + PuoT uoBso-lFuoPuo
1 +1 T
1 Puo TBuopuo + 2poo uoPjo + Puo FuoBuo Irvopuo
1
_> -Po (ruo + Buo)Buo- 1 (ruo + Buo)Pvo
We obtain the first inequality by the Jacobian similarity property and the second
inequality since A > 1,
1
PuoTfuouo o f poTLruopuo.A
From (6.19), we conclude that,
SjIBuo-1(Fuo + Buo)puo •uo < 4ApsoTBuoPsoA BUO
=* PsoTBuoPso >
1
(2A) 2 Buo -l(ro + Buo)Puo 11Buo
'r7 , ' 1,
SPso' BuoPso Po r v)v-' l
-
(2A)2 U Uo+
uo + Buo)Pvu6.20)
Substitute (6.20) into the closed-form solution for the price of anarchy (6.5),
POA
PuoTFuoPuo
PsoTBuopso
/ (2A) 2 pUoTruoPuo
puo(ruo + Buo)Buo -l(ruo + Buo)puo
1Remark 6.4.2. Notice that if we let w = ruo Puo and
IV
Guo = o-uo BuoIo -o , then we can simplify the upper bound as follows,
(2A) 2wTw
POA <
wT(Guo + Guo -1 + 2I)w
Therefore, versions of Theorem 5.3.1 and Proposition 5.3.2 for the upper bound also
apply in the nonlinear demand case.
Remark 6.4.3. When the demand function is affine, (i.e., A = 1), the upper bound
also coincides with the result we obtained in Chapter 5.
6.5 Tightness of the Lower Bound under Nonlin-
ear Demand
Figure 6-1 depicts the simulation result of the lower bound for the price of anarchy
when nonlinear demand models are used. At every iteration, we randomly generate
the parameters for the nonlinear demand functions that satisfy Assumptions 6 and
7, e.g., concave quadratic functions of the form: qi = di - aip2 - 7iPi + 0-ip-i.
Next, we solve both the user and the system optimization problems for this nonlinear
demand function and compute the optimal solutions respectively. We substitute the
user optimal prices into the Jacobian matrix to obtain Buo. Lastly, making use of
1 1
Guo = rfuo-Buoruoo -  and Equation (6.16), we compute the lower bound for
the price of anarchy.
From Figure 6-1, we see that the lower bound is not very tight. One explanation
is the choice of the constant A, as it determines the tightness of the bound. In the
analysis in the previous section, one example for this constant A is,
A ma(- Jh(p))A = max
P Amin(-Jh(p))
However, it is hard to find such a constant as we have to search through all the feasible
values of p. Therefore, we use the optimal prices of the user optimization problem
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
07v.,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No. of iterations
Figure 6-1: Nonlinear demand model
and A becomes the condition number of the Jacobian matrix, i.e.,
A ax&(-Jh(pvo))
Amin(- Jh(puo))
By doing so, we trade off the tightness of the lower bound for constant A which is
easier to compute.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we studied the price of anarchy in a Bertrand oligopoly market by
comparing the total profits generated by the user and the system optimization setting
respectively. The most notable result of this thesis is a lower and an upper bound
for the price of anarchy depending on the eigenvalues of the price sensitivity matrix
or a price sensitivity ratio. We first apply the analysis to affine symmetric demand
models. We compare and discuss the tightness of the bounds. We would like to bring
to the attention of the reader the fact that the bounds do not depend on quality
differences among sellers. The same analysis has also been extended to the affine
asymmetric demand model where we include two constants that measure the degree
of asymmetry of the price sensitivity matrix. In addition, we extend the analysis to
the nonlinear demand model with ideas similar to that used in the affine demand
model.
For the general uniform demand model, we have shown that POA, is the worst-
case value for the price of anarchy, when quality differences do not exist. When
the quality differences are allowed to vary, we have shown that the price of anarchy
increases when the number of sellers in the market increases and/or the coefficient of
variation increases.
There are several extensions to the current model that could be proposed for future
research. These include:
1. Price of anarchy bounds in a Cournot rather than a Bertand oligopoly market.
2. Incorporating multiple products with common resource constraints:
It would be interesting to extend this work to consider multiple substitutable,
differentiated products being sold by sellers, where each seller has his own port-
folio of products. In addition, the total quantity available for these products
might be tied by capacity or other common resource constraints.
3. More sophisticated demand functions under fewer assumptions:
One could use a more complicated demand function, e.g., use the logit demand
function to capture a more realistic setting.
4. Examine the price of anarchy in a multi-period setting for perishable or non-
perishable products with various capacity or other constraints.
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Appendix A
M-matrix
M-matrix is a very important special class of real positive stable matrices. We briefly
introduce some of the key concepts of M-matrices that are drawn upon in the thesis.
Definition A.0.1. A matrix A is called an M-matrix if A E Z, and A is positive
stable (if every eigenvalue has positive real part), where Z, = {A = [aij] E M(IR)
aij • 0 if i j, i,j = 1,... , n}
In order to recognize M-matrices in the immense variety of ways in which they arise,
it is useful to list several necessary and sufficient conditions for a given matrix in Z,
to be an M-matrix. The reader who is interested in the proof for these properties can
refer to Horn and Johnson [15].
Theorem A.0.1. If A E Zn, the following statements are equivalent:
1. A is positive stable, that is, A is an M-matrix.
2. A = aI - PP > 0, a > p(P).
3. Every real eigenvalue of A is positive.
4. A is nonsingular and A - 1 > 0.
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5. The diagonal entries of A are positive and there exist positive diagonal matri-
ces D, E such that DAE is both strictly row diagonally dominant and strictly
column diagonally dominant.
Theorem A.0.2. Let A, B E Zn and assume that A = [aij] is an M-matrix and
B > A. Then
1. B is an M-matrix.
2. A-l > B-' > 0.
3. det B > det A > 0
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Appendix B
Proof for Proposition
Proof. From Equation (4.8),
J(r, n, CV2 )
+ (n-1)(2-r) CV 21 + 2(n-1)+r 2
1 + (n-1)(1-r) CV 2
n-1+r
A(r, n, CV2)
B(r, n, CV 2)
Differentiating J(r, n, CV) with respect to n,
OJ(r, n, CV2 )
On
BA - A BBn an
B 2
2r(n - 1)(2 - r) 2(2(n - 1) + r CV2
(2(n - 1) + r) 3
and
OB
On
r(n- 1) CV 2
(n - 1 + r)
We substitute and into Equation (B.1). Because B(r, n, CV 2) is always great
103
Because
(B.1)
than or equal to 1, it is sufficient to just look at the numerator.
BoA OBB -A
5n an
OA OB OA (n - 1)(1 - r) 2
On On On n- 1+r
_ B ((n - 1)(2- r) 2 CV2
On 2(n- 1) + r
To prove OJ(r,n,CV) > 0 we need to prove -A B > 0 and LA (n-1)(1-r) 0BOn n-1+r On (n-1)(2-r) 22(n-l)+r )
It can be shown as follows:
r(n- 1))2 CV2
-(n-l¥r)• )v2r(n - 1)(2- r)2(n- 1 + r)2 - r(n - 1)(2(n- 1) + r)3 CV2
(2(n - 1) + r)3 (n - 1 + r)2
= r(2(nC-1 +r) 2 (n - )(2-r)-(1- r)(2(n -1)+r)3)CV
r (2(n - 1 + r)2(n - 1)(2 - r)2 - (1 - r)(2(n - 1) + r)3) 3CV
8r(2( ((n - + r)2(n 3 (n- 1 r)2 CV(2(n - 1) + r)3(n - I + r)2
Note that BA
an
B- =0 iff r = 0. Thus,On
OA(n- 1)(1-r)
On n-1+r
B 2(n- 1)(2-r )2
8n 2(n- 1) + r
r) 2 (2(n - 1) + r) V22r(n - 1 + r)(n - 1)2(1 - r)(2 - r) 3 (2(n - 1) (2r) -
(n - 1 + r)3(2(n - 1) + r)3
= r(n1) 2(l-r)(2-r) 2 CV 2 (2(n - 1 + r) - (2(n - 1) + r))
(n - 1 + r) 3 (2(n - 1) + r)3
forn> 2
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OA OB
On -n
2r(n - 1)(2 - r)2(2(n - 1) + r)3
OA OB > 0,for r > 0 and n > 2
On On -
r2(n- 1)2(1 
- r)(2 - r) 2  2= -1 + r)2(-- CV >+ 0,
(n2 - 1 + r)3(2(n - 1) + r)3
Thus, we have shown that °J(r,n,•V 2 ) > 0 for n > 2, that is, J(r, n, CV2 ) increases
with n. O
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